The overall public sentiment towards the UK's Strategic Defence Review is predominantly negative. There is a significant level of skepticism and distrust concerning the government's capability to effectively prioritize national defense over pressing domestic issues, such as healthcare and poverty. Many commentators question the practicality, financial allocation, and strategic decisions involved in the defense review, perceiving it as a politically motivated move rather than a genuine enhancement of national security. There is also a strong demand for addressing domestic concerns before engaging in foreign conflicts, with frustration over the emphasis on military expansion amidst socio-economic challenges.

UK Government

NATO

UK Military

Snapshot of _The Strategic Defence Review, Britain and sea power_ :

An archived version can be found [here](https://archive.is/?run=1&amp;url=https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/app/uploads/2024/11/No-2024_35-The-Strategic-Defence-Review-Britain-and-sea-power.pdf)  or [here.](https://archive.ph/?run=1&amp;url=https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/app/uploads/2024/11/No-2024_35-The-Strategic-Defence-Review-Britain-and-sea-power.pdf)         


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The crux of the report's suggestion is this section:

&gt; This means it makes no sense for HM Government to duplicate eorts being taken by key European NATO allies, such as Poland, Germany and the Nordic and Baltic states. These allies have underway substantial land-based military modernisation programmes of their own; Poland alone has ordered over 1,000 South Korean K2 main battle tanks, while Germany plans to invest over €100 billion (£84 billion) into the Bundeswehr over the next few years.

While they (oddly, imo) stop short of outright saying it, they're suggesting the Royal Navy receive the lion's share of any extra defence spending, and that the UK should focus primarily on delivering a maritime capability to NATO, because there are already other NATO countries going all-in on their armies.

PoachTWC

Executive Summary:

&gt; Similarly to the previous administration, the new Labour government has pledged to embrace a ‘North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-first’ defence posture. A Strategic Defence Review is now underway to reappraise and determine the shape of the United Kingdom’s (UK) future defences.      
&gt;    
&gt; Given British dependence on the sea for economic growth and  prosperity, as well as the Net Zero agenda, the sea power remains central  to the national effort. Britain is situated at the centre of the Euro-Atlantic world, a perspective it should embrace and promote. 
&gt;     
&gt; As it looks to boost investment in defence to 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and move towards greater integration between the armed forces, the new government should place sea power at the heart of its agenda. The Council on Geostrategy is delighted to aid such thinking with the founding of its Sea Power Laboratory.

One particularly nice graphic from the report is [this map](https://nitter.poast.org/pic/orig/media%2FGbssiOtbYAA4s1B.jpg), which I think makes it much clearer what the UK's strategic priorities need to be for our armed forces. Apart from the critical fact that well over 90% of our trade is maritime and the need to protect that trade abroad; at a fundamental level the UK's primary theatre in any major war (and therefore the theatre we need to be ready to fight in to deter that war) is the waters to the north of the UK.

tree_boom

Honestly I think we should spend 2% of GDP minimum on just the navy, not including the nuclear deterant or pensions. 

Far-Requirement1125

Excellent suggestion.

Geostrategy.org.uk has always understood that the UK's foriegn policy problems are fundamentally [maritime] in a post cold-war world.

Jedibeeftrix

The only way forward that makes sense for the UK, and most European countries, is significantly greater cooperation and integration of armed forces.

Whilst the UK doesn't have enough of... Most things, it seems fairly obvious that it should focus on its navy, air force,, cyber, logistics, etc. rather than land forces. We should be spending an awful lot more on R&amp;D (and this doesn't just apply to defence R&amp;D).

There's no good reason for the UK to have the numbers of tanks, infantry, etc. that do make sense if you are, say, Poland. 

We are an island. We depend upon trade and, for many things, imports. These come, overwhelmingly, via the sea. 

As is the case in most developed countries, we have an aging population. Resources are increasingly stretched. We have to prioritise and, to an extent, gamble on likely future events. 

The likelihood that we'll be going to war with Germany or Poland over the next 50 years, and that we'd feel the need to comit large numbers to the continent towards such a war? Pretty minimal. 

The likelihood that we'll suffer an invasion that warrants maintaining large numbers of infantry and tanks? Again, minimal.

_abstrusus

I’m not an expert so open to correction, but haven’t navies proven to be a bit useless recently? The Russian Black Sea fleet has been taken out by some 3d printed drones and the US trillion dollar carrier group can’t stop the Houthis?

legendary_m

Anyone who thinks they can win wars without a large well equipped standing army is deluded and I have a bridge to sell you.

Saying...oh well our colleagues are heavily investing in their armies and they'll help us is utterly deranged and is quite frankly outright lies to fool the public so they don't have to invest.

Jay_6125

Somebody said the Royal Navy is 40 ships short to properly patrol the Greenland - Iceland - UK gap

Might have been that bloke who does Pax Americana on YouTube

No_Valuable_6179

Below is a comparative analysis of **Defence in a Competitive Age** (the 2021 Command Paper) versus the **Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer** (the 2025 SDR), highlighting continuities and changes in strategic direction, emphasis, and geopolitical focus—particularly with respect to the Euro-Atlantic area.

# 1. Threat Perception and Strategic Context

# 2021 (Defence in a Competitive Age)

* **Multipolarity and Great-Power Competition**: Emphasises a shift towards a more multipolar world, with rising competition between “near-peer” states (notably China and Russia). It warns that monolithic assumptions from the post-Cold War era are no longer valid, and stresses the need to “seek out and understand future threats” before matching them with capabilities .
* **Persistent Hybrid/Gray-Zone Risks**: Highlights that adversaries will “employ brinkmanship, malign activity below the threshold of armed conflict, terrorism, proxies, and economic coercion”—often leveraging cyber or information campaigns.
* **Technological Erosion of Advantage**: Warns that the UK’s historic technological edge is challenged by targetted investments (e.g., hypersonics, integrated air defenses, anti-satellite weapons).
* **Broader Transnational Challenges**: Identifies climate change, pandemics, and terrorism as “threat multipliers” that will drive instability and affect the operating environment.

# 2025 (Strategic Defence Review 2025)

* **Return of State-on-State War in Europe**: Places Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022) front and centre, underscoring that “state conflict has returned to Europe” and that Russia is “blurring the lines between nuclear, conventional, and sub-threshold threats.”
* **Accelerated Geopolitical Volatility**: Argues that the deterioration in global stability since 2021 is even sharper, with concurrent challenges—from nuclear risks to cyber incursions—requiring urgent adaptation.
* **Nuclear Coercion and Proliferation**: Warns that Russia and China are placing nuclear weapons “at the centre of their security strategies,” doubling arsenals, and eroding arms-control structures.
* **Daily Sub-Threshold Attacks on the UK**: Introduces the notion that the UK is subject to “daily” espionage, cyber-attacks, and disinformation, requiring “a whole-of-society approach” to resilience.
* **Technology Driving Warfare**: Echoes but intensifies the 2021 emphasis: drones, AI, autonomy, and digital networks fundamentally change how wars are fought, making “simple metrics such as numbers of platforms” obsolete.

**Continuity**: Both documents recognise a more competitive, multipolar environment, with Russia and China as primary state threats and hybrid/gray-zone tactics.  
**Change**: The 2025 Review frames the return of major‐power war in Europe as an immediate, existential challenge—sharpened by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine—whereas the 2021 plan saw that as a looming risk. In 2025, sub-threshold attacks (cyber, espionage, information manipulation) on the UK are described as “daily,” reflecting a stepped-up threat to domestic resilience.

#

gadarnol

If you didn't see why Large Language Models have the capacity to do work like this well now you have. AI can fabricate data so check against originals: as I posted it I could see that it had referred accurately to text of 2025 that I had seen so far but I will continue to check back.

https://preview.redd.it/v78axiqvfk4f1.jpeg?width=1284&amp;format=pjpg&amp;auto=webp&amp;s=c9ab6479a71e4ba93c656b066c7df57ac9d511c8

Former Downing Street Chief of Staff not impressed

Britain needs to put itself on a war footing amid the increasing threat from Russia and other hostile states, the [strategic defence review](https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/uk-iron-dome-missile-shield-israeli-arms-eyes-sky-3536234?srsltid=AfmBOooXuB_Rz9qHie8gqY_4fx7oIIK4eFoP23Z_aogwW6yjZuFxJzII&amp;ico=in-line_link) (SDR) is expected to say.

The review, likely to be published later this month, will call for a change in the “whole society mindset” towards defence and homeland security, with a need for greater civilian awareness of global insecurity, *The i Paper* understands.

It is understood that the review’s authors have looked at the defence model in Finland and other northern European countries, which are on the frontline against [Russia](https://inews.co.uk/news/trump-finally-aligned-europe-ukraine-will-stop-putin-3687035?ico=in-line_link), where small full-time armies are backed up by a civilian force ready to deploy at short notice if needed.

While the SDR is not going to propose a cut to the British armed forces, or suggest military service for civilians, it is likely to say that the “mindset” of civilian society and the industrial sector should be more geared towards national security.

This is expected to include more public awareness of defence threats and a greater focus on critical national infrastructure.

The long-awaited SDR is expected to be published later this month – potentially coinciding with Keir Starmer’s hosting of a crucial UK-EU summit on 19 May, when European leaders will agree a defence pact to strengthen security following the retreat of US support under Donald Trump.

Insiders say an initial draft of the document was handed over to ministers earlier this year, but the government insists its publication has not been delayed because it was always going to be in the “spring”.

theipaper

I don't understand the idea that a country shouldn't *always* be ready for war.

GrizzledFart

If they want a sociable change then we need to improve our image of guns and self defense. Hard to go from not being allowed to kill someone who is sexually assaulting them or not being allowed to carry around non-lethal protection like pepper spray in a state where individualism is promoted to telling people  to be ready to kill and defend others miles away while we ourselves are an island with nukes. Easier and cheaper to go above and beyond with supporting Ukraine. If we're going to make weapons intended for Russia anyways.

chaos_slam

[deleted]


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Sidenote: I'm starting to have a lot of sympathy for [mid-1930s defence planners](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3489289), when the UK's budget [rose from 2.2% to 6.9%](https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/lessons-from-the-1930s-rearm-according-to-the-threat-not-the-fiscal-rules/) in five years.

-smartcasual-

I think delaying the review would do more harm than good, especially given the fairly dire state of the army in particular, and the need to commit to a clear strategic vision for defence. All else flows from there; a  lot of the difficulties the UK currently faces stem from the government refusing to articulate and wholeheartedly commit to a clear vision for defence since at least 2014, leading to a decade+ of indecision, half-hearted efforts, and spinning wheels, all while the threats the UK faces only became larger and more proximate. I think further delays risk making the perfect the fatal enemy of the good, and prevent the initial work to seriously rearm and properly restructure our existing forces from getting started.

I'd also argue that, even in the worst case scenario, much of the work of the SDR will still likely be valid, and while the loss of US support is potentially highly significant, neither is it necessarily 100% devastating. The overarching threat picture won't change, our alliances with our European partners through NATO will still be essential to our security, and the areas of weakness currently present in our own forces for facing that threat will still be as present as they previously were.

Hedging against potential US absence will require some adjustment, but I'd argue that'd look more like an evolution/expansion of our existing roles/capabilities, rather than a complete rethinking of our contribution to the alliance. As you note. the burden of potentially replacing the US would be taken up by Europe as a whole. The UK by itself wouldn't have to take on the full spectrum of US enabling capabilities/contributions, only those it is already most suited to provide. Obviously it'll depend on what the review already recommends, and what our European allies agree/propose, but expanding our existing AWACS and MSR orders, for example, would go a long way towards duplicating key US capabilities without having to tear up the entire SDR.

Imo at most, a supplemental review next year to fine-tune things, and enthusiastic participation in any joint European initiatives would be sufficient to cover off that potential. While sub-optimal, it would be better than yet again disrupting the whole process in search of a perfect solution.

Fwiw I'd argue talk about moving away from NATO elsewhere is more to do with domestic/industrial politics within the EU, combined with a bit of tubthumping than any genuine move to ditch or replace the alliance. While US flakiness might require significant reform to the Alliance as an organisation, trying to replace it outright quickly is going to be more difficult than some continentalist sloganeering. An EU-derived force runs into all the same issues an EU army does. Either way though, I'd argue our role in such an alliance would still be *broadly* the same as it is in NATO, and we're too much of a linchpin to be cut out.

Corvid187

It needs to be published. The forces need a vision, something to work towards. As someone else has said, much of the report will be valid regardless. We've always known we have gaps in our defence and we have an overreliance on the United States, so it won't exactly come as a surprise that we need to improve our air &amp; missile defence capabilities, for example.

Ultimately, this review will always push the UK towards enhancing its warfighting capabilities, taking lessons from Ukraine. The interesting part will be how the UK fits within European defence as a whole. I believe Europe &amp; Canada need to 'delegate' areas of responsibility. E.g. Italy &amp; Spain focus on the Mediterranean &amp; southern Europe, Turkey focus on the Middle East &amp; Black Sea, Canada &amp; Scandinavia focus on the arctic &amp; northern Europe, Poland &amp; Germany build large land armies for Eastern Europe, France build another large force with substantial expeditionary capability, UK build a sizeable naval forces, with substantial expeditionary capability.

Obviously, not that simple. But my point is, the UK will never replace the US in Europe. No country can, so we need to look at who has the best institutional knowledge &amp; training in a paticular element of war, and push them towards enhancing that. Additionally, Trump is pushing us to take leadership of NATO in Europe, it'll be interesting to see how we take that. We could go all in with the navy, could see us take full leadership of the Baltics, could see us rebuild another large land army (foolish idea anyway).

Mediocre_Painting263

This is the same problem this sub faces, but with actual stakes. How can you analyze, forecast etc. when the structures it all rests on, are flailing around and collapsing?

For overall planning in such an environment, releasing a higher level view with slots for specifics later can work well (being mindful to avoid coupling things across shearing layers) for standards. Invariably, some specifics are never quite determined, but the overall structure suffices. *The more specific, the more brittle.*

In some cases, instead of implementations waiting for the completed standard, further specification follows/averages implementations of the broader standard etc. I believe this model is similar to such broad policy setting (which, in Western countries, will not specify specifics like procurement contracts).

I look at this from a software lens (cf. Scheme and Common Lisp standardization processes, design of Rust and Zig vs. wider concepts like Forth, APL or Lisp overall.) In software:

&gt; no ethically-trained software engineer would ever consent to write a DestroyBaghdad procedure. Basic professional ethics would instead require him to write a DestroyCity procedure, to which Baghdad could be given as a parameter.

Were I drafting the SDR, I'd try to abstract NATO away, using a concept like "our allies in the N. Atlantic region" but I don't think that's possible. Friendly, belligerent or apathetic US postures change the picture across all shearing layers to the point where I would pause the process and try to escalate to political soul searching. Some further [thoughts](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1ij1yvy/active_conflicts_news_megathread_february_06_2025/mbbgxm7/).

Veqq

The UK is unusually closely tied to the USA, because at least the maintenance of its strategic deterrent requires the co-operation of the USA, and because of its intelligence-sharing arrangements. It is no longer a member of the EU, and there are still people on both sides with memories of Brexit. Unlike some other members of the British left, Starmer seems to have noticed that gratuitous insults are not a good way of introducing yourself to Trump, who I suspect would quite like to be an anglophile, if he is allowed to be. I think the SDR would do well to underline the assumption of US alignment several times in red, for the politicians to see, and then carry on as before.

mcdowellag

&gt;On the other, there have been indications from the new US leadership of variable commitment to its Art. 5 obligations (eg explicitly restating guarantees to the UK, but not the Baltics).

Just the other day, in the meeting with Zelensky:

&gt;President Trump: I'm very committed to Poland. I think Poland has really stepped up and done a great job for NATO. As you know, they paid more than they had to. They are one of the finest groups of people I've ever known. I'm very committed to Poland.

&gt;The Press: What about Baltics?

&gt;President Trump: Poland's in a tough neighborhood you know?

&gt;The Press: What about Baltics— the Baltics?

&gt;President Trump: The Baltics, they got a lot of— it's a tough neighborhood too, but we're committed. We're going to be very committed and we're committed to NATO, but NATO has to step up and the Europeans have to step up more than they have and I want to see them equalize because they are in for far less than we're in and they should be at least equal.

Of course, the Baltics are already spending about as much as the US.

WulfTheSaxon

I am amazed at the apparent surprise displayed at Russian sub surface monitoring of our nuclear submarines .Perhaps the MoD and Government should be reminded that the Russians spend billions on espionage, so why on earth would they think that our nuclear subs are somehow not included in these Russian activities. Another potential surprise, awaiting. is should a nuclear war ever break out, it would be to learnthat the first nuclear bomb to land would be within 5 minutes of war being declared or maybe even five minutes befor war is declared and it would be on Faslane where 75% of our nuclear response capability sewings on its anchor chains .

We should not be surprised, too, if a war between the UK and Russia maybe desribed by Russia as merely a war between those two countries, and they have no intention to extend the war. Does the MoD and Government really think that all America would wish to sacrifice itself to join in . That must be very much in doubt. Therefore, for the UK to have a credible nucleear deterent which is sufficient to deter it must be able to totaly destroy Russia. For this then we need at least nine nuclear submarines with three on patrol at any given time and the remaining six at dispersed non specific locations .

The threat of engaging in nuclear war is so horrific, too, that you simply cannot trust your friends to help defend you. Thus to be credible the UK must have sufficicent , stand alone, capability, to make war against us as unthinkable by at potential aggressor. What every you do, though, do not group your nuclear assets together in one place !

Just-Yogurt5020

The SDR leaks begin - there's a (small) chance it could be released today, necessary if we are to meet the government's self-imposed deadline of "spring" as Parliament is in recess for the rest of it.

&gt; Tanks, armoured vehicles and attack helicopters will go into battle after sending a swarm of drones at the enemy under plans to reform how the British Army fights.      
&gt;       
&gt; The strategic defence review will set out a new way of fighting known as “20-40-40”, which aims to reduce troop casualties. This “autonomy drive” is part of innovation plans that will form a chunk of the review, which has been worked on for nearly a year.      
&gt;       
&gt; “It is about pairing the old existing heavy metal with the new and making the army more lethal,” a Ministry of Defence source involved in drawing it up said.      
&gt;       
&gt; Expensive, heavy equipment such as tanks will make up roughly 20 per cent of fighting capability, positioned further from the front line until a later stage of battle.      
&gt;       
&gt; Soldiers in Challenger 3 tanks will deploy kamikaze drones and others will fire long-range precision missiles at the enemy. “Single-use” items such as drones that explode on impact and shells make up this “40” element.      
&gt;       
&gt; Reusable drones, typically costlier and more durable reconnaissance or attack drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper, will make up the remaining “40”.      
&gt;       
&gt; Russia has shifted to using motorbikes on the battlefield rather than heavy armour because the Ukrainians have become so effective in taking out their equipment with drones, according to the MoD’s intelligence unit.      
&gt;       
&gt; Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defence minister, told The Times this month that the first 10-30km of Ukraine’s front line against Russia were “completely transparent and completely controlled by drones on both sides”.      
&gt;       
&gt; The strategic defence review is understood to be less about cuts, because those announcements have already been made, and more about bolstering the power of existing equipment by focusing on autonomy, drones and artificial intelligence.      
&gt;       
&gt; It has been shaped by the war in Ukraine and a lot of work to learn its lessons. If Europe does end up at war with Russia, there are fears that President Putin’s soldiers will be far more capable and battle-hardened. As a result, the Ukrainians are trying to teach the British and other allies all they can to prepare for their own war.      
&gt;        
&gt; Kateryna Chernohorenko, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, said the Ukrainians were developing an app comprised of the latest training materials which they could share with allies such as Britain.

The UK undertakes a significant overhaul of its defense strategy, emphasizing readiness and investments amidst rising global threats.

UK Strategic Defence Review and War-Fighting Readiness

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